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collected from scholarly articles and monographs on Hamas, the analysis also draws on a number of interviews of Palestinian scholars, commentators, and associated and high-ranking Hamas cadres conducted on the West Bank in the summer of 2007 and spring of 2011.
Party change: theoretical perspectives
The decision to employ party theories is based on their explanatory power -a strength stemming from the rich tradition of party studies in political science. However, and notwithstanding the recent theoretical convergence in the literature such as the softened requirements of rationality and the recognition that both organizational and structural factors have impact on party behavior, 11 the literature still suffers two shortcomings: First, a unifying theoretical framework is lacking, and second is the heavy European bias.
12
While complementary theories dealing with different aspects of political parties constitutes a 'cumulative theory', alleviating the lack of an overarching theory, 13 the European bias poses potentially serious challenges when party theories are applied elsewhere. This bias leads to a presumption that parties operate in relatively stable environments with a certain degree of predictability, qualities the volatile and conflict-prone environment in which Hamas operates lacks. Employing party theories to investigate Hamas's changing electoral strategy therefore risks conflating and reducing the theories' analytical value by stretching both intention and range. 14 David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'stretching' revisited: Adapting categories in comparative analysis," American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 845-855. While party theories are developed for the analysis of parties in advanced democracies, they nevertheless contain elements relevant for the study of political parties in nascent democracies. 15 And, from the plethora of theoretical approaches offered in the literature, the analytical framework proposed by Harmel and Janda is intended to analyze exactly the type of fundamental strategic change that Hamas pulls by replacing boycott with participation. While staying alert to the potential challenges of theoretical stretching, this framework will be employed to analyze Hamas's changing strategy.
Harmel and Janda's theory rests on a slightly modified version of Strøm's behavioral theory of parties, adding a fourth ideal party type to his three: (1) the vote-seeking party that aims to 'maximize … electoral support for the purpose of controlling the government'; (2) the office-seeking party which primary goal is to win control of office; (3) the policy-seeking party that has policy implementation as its primary goal, preferring to 'stay true' over winning votes or office; 16 and (4) the intraparty democracy maximization party identified by Harmel and Janda -which aims to express and pursue the (changing) goals of its members. Strøm, "A behavioral theory of competitive political parties". Office-seeking parties only exist within multiparty systems as the possibility of coalition governments is a prerequisite for office-maximization without votemaximization.
17
Harmel and Janda, "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change, Strøm, "A behavioral theory of competitive political parties," 570.
19
Steven B. Wolinetz, "Beyond the catch-all party: approaches to the study of parties and party organization in contemporary democracies," in Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges, ed. José Ramón Montero, It is assumed that parties are conservative organizations, and consequently that '[p]arty change does not "just happen" '. 20 Rather, altered party behavior is a consequence of repriotiziation of strategic aims, brought about by one or more of the following explanatory variables: (1) external stimuli or shock, (2) change of dominant faction(s), and (3) change of party leader.
21
Of these, external stimuli and shocks are expected to be the salient initiators of change. While adaptation to minor environmental challenges might be accommodated by the existing leadership, more serious challenges and shocks can bring about intraparty competition and lead to a change of leadership and/or the emergence of a new dominant faction -which in turn can produce dramatic changes in party behavior.
22
Again given the volatile and unpredictable political conditions in the oPt, the environmental challenges often cited as producing party change, e.g., high inflation or electoral defeat, are considered too narrow for Hamas. Instead, resembling the effect the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union had on communist parties throughout Europe, the analysis will focus on broader factors, including the Israeli occupation, the deteriorating security, political and economic conditions in the oPt, and intra-Palestinian struggle.
The organization and the environment
Hamas is a complex organization, and a short descriptive outline is therefore called for to better understand its strategic aims and behavior. A brief overview of the environment in which Hamas operates is also needed to grasp the challenges facing the party.
Richard Gunther, and Juan J. Linz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 163-4. 20 "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change," 261.
21
"External stimuli" refers to developments in the political environment forcing all or most parties to adapt. "External shocks" are environmental changes that fundamentally challenge a given party's primary goal and ideology, and can lead to more radical party change. See Ibid., 267-8. 22 Ibid., 267; Panebianco, Political parties: organization and power, 243-4. Specifically, assumption A2 in Harmel and Janda's theory states that " [w] hen party change occurs, it is imposed by the dominant coalition at the time of change", 278.
History and organizational outline of Hamas
On the eve of the first intifada (uprising) in 1987, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was under increasing pressure from its own rank-and-file to change its non-violent modus operandi and take active part in the uprising. Participating under its own banner, however, would put its wide network of welfare institutions at risk from Israeli repercussions. Hedging its bets, the Brotherhood therefore established Hamas as its armed proxy. Created to fight independently in the intifada but covertly in service of the Brotherhood, Hamas would allow the Brotherhood to credibly claim that they did not employ violent tactics and thus avoid reprisals from Israel, while at the same time respond to the demands to join the intifada.
23
Hamas gained popularity because of its pivotal role in the intifada, and it expanded rapidly by establishing local offices throughout the oPt, regional headquarters on the West The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence, 2000, 35-7. 24 Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 39; Are Knudsen, "Crescent and Sword: The Hamas Enigma," Third World Quarterly 26, no. 8 (2005) : 1382-4. Note that Hamas is a multifaceted organization, and it can therefore be difficult to distinguish between the core of the party and the more loosely affiliated parts of the broader Islamic movement in the oPt. 
As the organization grew and important responsibilities were delegated to the external politburo, internal legitimacy and cohesion came at risk. Drawing on the Islamic tradition of shura, or consultation, Hamas introduced vertically inclusive decision-making procedures, seeking to reach consensus rather than leaving important decision to the powers that be. By encouraging members to voice their opinion, the leadership would be able to make decisions with broad support in the organization. Such intraparty democracy enhances the legitimacy of the leadership and can facilitate membership discipline. However, it can also lead to factionalization, a tendency that at times has been exacerbated because the branches of Hamas operate under different conditions and with high degrees of autonomy. In particular UNSCR 242 is important, as it calls for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in the Six-Day War in 1967.
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has carried out targeted assassinations of Palestinian leaders. 29 In sum, Israel dictates the conditions in the oPt, and its changing policies and military interventions produce environmental challenges and shocks that seriously affect Hamas.
Hamas is also influenced by domestic actors, primarily the PLO. Long dominated by the Fatah-party and its late leader Yasir Arafat, the PLO is the internationally recognized representatives of the Palestinian people. Illustrative of its importance, the PLO has observer status in the UN General Assembly, and it was the PLO that signed the Oslo Accords on behalf of the Palestinians, thereby ending the first intifada and establishing the PNA as the Palestinian proto-state.
30
Though the PNA nominally was an independent political entity, it was cadres and guerrillas from Fatah and the PLO that filled its political positions and bureaucracy, and formed the backbone of its security forces -in effect recreating the PNA as their own tool.
31
Suffice it to say, this Fatah-PLO-PNA nexus is a formidable political force in the oPt, and isapart from Israel -the most influential actor vis-à-vis Hamas.
There are also certain international actors wielding limited but determining influence over Hamas. Hamas's allies and sponsors include Iran and Syrian, as well branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, and private benefactors from the Gulf. As is expected from a young, radical party, Hamas prioritized to stay true to its stated aims rather than compromising on its ideology, thus closely resembling the policy-advocacy ideal party in the typology of Harmel and Janda. 40 The following paragraphs will outline some of the strategic reasoning and organizational interplay that led Hamas to boycott the 1996 elections.
Violent strategy
Faced with the option to participate in conventional politics, Hamas had to weigh the benefits of a participatory strategy against the loss of legitimacy and popularity such a move would entail. Hamas's raison d'être had been the intifada, and its legitimacy after the Oslo Accords effect mean retracting its stated aims while at the same time lending credibility to negotiations Hamas vehemently opposed. 41 Hamas calculated that participating would be perceived as compromising on its overarching ideology, specifically with regard to the territorial claim of historic Palestine, and that such compromises would lead to loss of legitimacy and popular support.
42
As succinctly summarized by a Hamas cadre, they opted for boycott because '[t]he election in 1996 was seen by Hamas as a referendum over Oslo' and Hamas's boycott was its 'no-vote'. The ideological argument was that Hamas should not join 'a system they hoped to replace for the sake of coexistence with a state they hoped to destroy ', 55 i.e., that joining the political system was tantamount to forfeiting its opposition against negotiations and thereby defaulting on the aim to liberate historic Palestine. This, it was argued, would lead to loss of support and subsequently decrease Hamas's influence in the oPt. Though they appealed to ideology and legitimacy, an important reason for the politburo and the military commanders to advocate boycott was a shared concern for power and positions. The al-Qassam commanders feared that political participation could supersede armed resistance as Hamas's main strategy and render them redundant. The external leadership worried that participation would shift the power-balance in favor of the domestic political leadership. If Hamas participated in elections it would be the domestic cadres that ran as candidates and reaped the political benefits, gaining organizational influence at the expense of the external leadership.
56
It is important to underline that the division was never a simple hard-liner outside vs. soft-liner inside dichotomy. Hamas co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and PNA Prime Minister to-be Ishmael Haniye argued for participation, while others, such as West Bank Hamas leader Bassam Jarrar argued against 'because these elections will be an enormous farce aimed at legitimizing the Oslo Accords'.
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As discussed, there were multiple reasons for Hamas to boycott. In the end, however, it was the dominance of the politburo and the al-Qassam commanders that determined the outcome of the discussion; their organizational influence was strong enough to tilt the internal referendum and secure a majority decision to boycott the elections. 
Environmental challenges
The signing of the first Oslo agreement in 1993 marked the end of the first intifada, and promised self-determination for the Palestinians in a not too distant future.
61
The first period in the 'Oslo era' was therefore characterized by optimism and great, albeit cautious, expectations among Palestinians.
62
While the Oslo Accords at first seemed to produce some of the anticipated results, such as withdrawal of Israeli troops from parts of the oPt, the return of the exiled PLO leadership, and the establishment of the PNA, matters soon turned for the worse.
elections in 1996 was a democratic one, e.g. senior Hamas cadre Dr. Mohamed Ghazal interviewed in Nablus, 17th April, 2011. Israeli security forces responded in kind, and in collaboration with the PNA a large number of suspected activists were arrested, imprisoned, assassinated, and deported. 64 However, as the PNA proved unable to halt the suicide operations -partly because of incompetence and partly because of a reluctance to crack down on its own constituents -the IDF closed borders and roads in the oPt, and arrested thousands of suspected Hamas activists in a bid to stop the violence. By filling this welfare vacuum, Hamas gained followers from most segments of society and enjoyed increased popularity.
68
In sum, the tactical reorientation strengthened Hamas's position and increased the relative power of the domestic political leadership at the expense of the military cadres -paving the way for a change of strategy.
External shocks
Three external shocks in the late 1990s and early 2000s also affected Hamas's internal power-balance, eventually leading the domestic political leadership to obtain factional dominance: First, the spiritual leader and co-founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, was released from Israeli prison and returned to Gaza in 1997; second, the Hamas politburo was Within, 110; McGeough, Kill Khalid; Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence, McGeough, Kill Khalid, 247-66; P.R. Kumaraswamy, "The Jordan-Hamas Divorce," Middle East Intelligence Bulleting 3, no. 8 (September 2001) . 71 Knudsen, "Crescent and Sword," 1373. 
Towards a pragmatic ideology?
In tandem with its organizational changes, Hamas also developed its ideology. Already early in the 1990s, certain leaders in Hamas had distanced themselves from the 1988 Charter, arguing that it was a rushed document and qualified neither as a constitution nor a textual framework for Hamas to base its operations on. A legacy from Hamas's intifada years, the radical rhetoric of the Charter came increasingly at odds with the changing public sentiment in the oPt. Hamas responded by proposing more pragmatic goals.
76
The most important change in Hamas's ideology is the implicit recognition of the 1967-borders by calling for a temporary two-state solution. The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence, 133. 76 Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, 147-9. Note, however, that the Charter has kept its official status. ICG, Dealing with Hamas, 13. 77 Hroub, Hamas: political thought and practice, 75. 78 Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, Considering how important the liberation of Palestine from 'the river to the sea' initially was for Hamas, the acceptance of the 1967-borders, if only as a temporary measure, must be considered a major ideological break.
By redefining its final objective into a vague goal to be reached 'later' and concentrate on current issues, Hamas conforms to the theoretical expectations; an ideological-oriented party must either respond to environmental challenges by articulating its goals more pragmatically or risk collapse. Such adaptation rarely amounts to a complete ideological reorientation, but imply a reduced focus on the more idealistic goals and the introduction of temporary or additional, pragmatic goals. Hamas's distinction between an 'interim solution' within the 1967-borders and a 'final goal of liberating historic Palestine' is interpreted as such a succession of ends, and it was a crucial factor when the Gaza leadership successfully advocated a participatory strategy while apparently remaining committed to the ultimate aims.
79
Interviewed Hamas cadres support this interpretation, ascribing changes in strategy to changing political and security conditions. number of followers while keeping its hard-line activists, and could supplement violent tactics with electoral participation without compromising on its ultimate aims. This succession of ends is therefore considered a crucial factor for Hamas's decision to participate in the 2006 elections, as it entailed a reprioritization of Hamas's strategy and a move from ideology-advocacy towards pragmatism and vote-seeking. Hamas could now participate without straying too far away from its long-term goals, i.e., without altering position on the peace process and without explicitly recognizing Israel. The suspension of the Oslo Accords allowed Hamas to pursue a participatory strategy without staking too much legitimacy, popularity or ideological capital.
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As such, the demise of the Oslo Accords is considered crucial pull factor contributing to Hamas's decision to participate in the 2006 elections.
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Another factor conducive for Hamas's participation was the long overdue institutionalization of the PNA. Throughout the Oslo years, the Palestinian president, Yasir Arafat, had exploited and maintained the institutional weaknesses of the PNA and tied its powers to his own person. Whatever institutional arrangements theoretically in place, the PNA was de facto dependent on Arafat, whose leadership was characterized as an antithesis of institutionalization. Arafat refused to ratify laws drafted by the PLC, rendering the legislature into a weak, consultative body, while he used a set of loyal security courts to sideline the official judiciary.
87
After immense international pressure, Arafat eventually ratified a constitution aimed to remedy the shortcomings of the PNA. 88 The 2002 Basic Law and its subsequent amendments strengthened the PLC by turning the PNA into a semi-presidential system with parliamentary rules. The PLC was given indirect control over the prime minister and the government, and the control of the security forces were divided between the president and the government. In 2005, a new election law was passed, introducing a mixed majority and proportional representation electoral system, and increasing the number of seats in the PLC from 88 to 132. 89 While the constitution on paper empowered the PLC, it was not until Yasir Arafat passed away in 2004 that the PNA began to institutionalize properly. As noted by renowned Palestinian scholar Dr. George Giacaman: 'Arafat was the glue that bound first Fatah, and secondly the PNA'. Because his style of leadership effectively 'deinstitutionalized Fatah [and] 87 deinstitutionalized the PNA', his death left Fatah and the PNA without their strongman. largely conformed to the theoretical propositions. Given that Hamas initially prioritized ideology-advocacy and intraparty democracy maximization, and taking the circumstances into consideration, the boycott of the 1996 elections was to be expected. Specifically, the analysis showed that the boycott was a result of environmental conditions favoring the factions most closely tied to Hamas's radical ideology and violent tactics. As stipulated in assumption A2 in Harmel and Janda's theory, the preferences of the dominant coalition or faction dictates party behavior, and thus accounts for Hamas's 1996 electoral boycott.
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Following Harmel and Janda's assumption A1 and its corollary A1', something forced Hamas to change, and in line with their assumption A2, party change often coincides with the emergence of a new dominant faction.
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Hamas's move from boycott to participation by and large fulfills these stipulations. The analysis demonstrated that environmental challenges and shocks robbed the coalition responsible for Hamas's 1996 boycott of its dominance, and in turn gave rise to a faction advocating participation. As such, both the composition of the dominant faction and the strategic aims of Hamas changed, and according to Harmel and Janda's propositions P12, a new dominant faction advocating a new strategy 'should produce the maximum amount of party change'.
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These theoretical assumptions and propositions thus largely account for Hamas's radical move from boycott to participation. Note that some pull factors without direct effect on Hamas's internal power-balance also played into the decision.
As an interpretative case study, the selected theories aided the analysis by providing relevant explanatory factors accounting for Hamas's strategic turnaround, and as a theory-confirming case study it demonstrated that the selected theories can be employed outside their intended range and assist in the study of Islamist parties -provided that the need for contextual sensitivity is properly appreciated.
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